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1 Introduction
Empirical studies show that individuals do not discount future values at the same rate.1 Since in-
dividuals investment in physical and human capital is strongly a¤ected by the way they discount
the future, this type of heterogeneity would naturally lead to cross-sectional di¤erences in wealth and
income. In this paper, we present a dynamic competitive equilibrium model in which heterogeneity
in time preferences alone can generate the observed patterns of wealth and income inequality in the
United States.
The importance of time preference heterogeneity in explaining wealth inequality is well acknowl-
edged by the existing studies. There is now a vast literature in macroeconomics that uses the incomplete
markets model of Huggett (1993, 1996) and Aiyagari (1994) to explain wealth and income inequal-
ity.2 The standard incomplete markets model, however, has di¢ culty in explaining certain features of
the wealth distribution in the United States. In particular, it fails to generate a high concentration of
wealth among the richest households.3 Krusell and Smith (1998) show that introducing time preference
heterogeneity can signicantly improve the Aiyagari (1994) model in this regard. Similarly, Hendricks
(2007) shows that introducing this type of heterogeneity into the life-cycle model of Huggett (1996)
can improve the models ability to account for wealth inequality.
In both Krusell and Smith (1998) and Hendricks (2007), cross-sectional variation in income is
mainly driven by uninsurable idiosyncratic earnings risk, which is exogenous and independent of the
heterogeneity in discount rates. These two exogenous and independent factors are then used to account
for the dispersion of wealth. These assumptions, however, ignore the e¤ects of time preferences on
lifetime earnings. Intuitively, more patient individuals are more willing to invest in physical as well as
human capital than less patient ones. A higher level of human capital then leads to a higher level of
earnings. This intuition is consistent with empirical ndings. Lawrance (1991) and Warner and Pleeter
(2001) nd that more-educated households and individuals tend to have lower discount rates than less-
educated ones. This linkage between patience and educational attainment implies that human capital
accumulation may provide an additional channel through which time preference heterogeneity can give
rise to income and wealth inequality. As explained below, this additional channel plays an important
1See, for instance, Hausman (1979), Lawrance (1991), and Warner and Pleeter (2001). A detailed review of this
literature can be found in Frederick et al. (2002) Section 6.
2An excellent review of this literature can be found in Heathcote et al. (2009).
3A detailed discussion of this problem can be found in Castañeda et al. (2003).
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role in the current study.
The main objective of this paper is to examine the connection between time preference heterogeneity
and economic inequality. There are three important di¤erences between this paper and the ones
mentioned above. First, the current study aims to explain both wealth and income inequality using
time preference heterogeneity alone. Second, the current study takes into account the endogenous
components of labor income, namely labor supply decisions and human capital accumulation. Third,
unlike Krusell and Smith (1998) which assume that individuals discount rates are stochastic and
idiosyncratic in nature, the current study focuses on xed, predetermined di¤erences in discount rates
across individuals.4
The model economy considered in this study is a variant of the deterministic neoclassical growth
model. It is now well known that standard neoclassical model has di¢ culty in generating realistic
wealth distribution based on di¤erences in discount rates alone. Becker (1980) shows that when
consumers have time-additive separable preferences and di¤erent constant discount rates, all the wealth
in the economy will eventually be concentrated in the hands of the most patient consumers. In
other words, the wealth distribution is degenerate in the long run. Several existing studies have
identied conditions under which the long-run wealth distribution is non-degenerate.5 The current
study presents a novel channel in establishing this result. Specically, we show that Beckers result
cannot be extended to an environment in which consumers derive utility from both consumption
and wealth. The assumption that consumers have direct preferences for wealth has long been used
in economic studies. In an early paper, Kurz (1968) introduces this type of preferences into the
optimal growth model and explores the long-run properties of the model. Zou (1994) interprets this
type of preferences as reecting the capitalist spirit, or the tendency to treat wealth acquisition
as an end in itself rather than a means of satisfying material needs. Cole et al. (1992) suggest
4Existing studies show that predetermined factors (or ex ante heterogeneity) are at least as important as idiosyncratic
shocks (or ex post heterogeneity) in explaining cross-sectional variation in lifetime utility. Keane and Wolpin (1997) argue
that as much as 90 percent of the dispersion in lifetime utility can be attributed to predetermined, xed factors. The
remaining ten percent is attributed to exogenous idiosyncratic shocks. Storesletten et al. (2004), on the contrary, give
greater importance to idiosyncratic shocks. However, their results show that predetermined factors can still account for
almost half of the dispersion in lifetime utility.
5Lucas and Stokey (1984) and Boyd (1990) show that Beckers result is no longer valid when consumers have recursive
preferences. Sarte (1997) establishes the existence of a non-degenerate wealth distribution by introducing a progressive tax
structure into Beckers model. Sorger (2002) shows that Beckers result cannot be extended to the case where consumers
are strategic players, rather than price-takers, in the capital market. Espino (2005) establishes a non-degenerate wealth
distribution by assuming that consumers have private information over an idiosyncratic preference shock. Except for Sarte
(1997), none of these studies have explored the quantitative implications of their model. Sarte shows that a calibrated
version of his model can replicate the income distribution in the United States. However, unlike the current study, he
does not attempt to explain wealth and income inequality simultaneously.
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that this type of preferences can serve as a reduced-form specication to capture peoples concern
for their wealth-induced status within society. Subsequent studies have followed these traditions and
interpreted this type of preferences as either capturing the spirit of capitalism or reecting the demand
for wealth-induced status. In this paper, we refer to this feature as wealth preference. There is now a
rapidly growing literature that explores the implications of wealth preference on a wide range of issues,
including asset pricing, economic growth, expectations-driven business cycles, the e¤ects of scal policy
and wealth inequality.6
In our baseline model, we adopt the same economic environment as in Becker (1980), which fea-
tures a neoclassical production technology, a complete set of competitive markets, consumers with
heterogeneous time preferences, and a borrowing constraint. Human capital formation is not consid-
ered at this stage. The only modication we make to Beckers model is the inclusion of wealth in
consumerspreferences. The main purpose of the baseline model is to illustrate the role of this feature
in the current study. It is shown that the baseline model possesses a unique stationary equilibrium in
which every consumer owns a positive amount of wealth. This result is obtained because introducing
a direct preference for wealth fundamentally changes consumersinvestment behavior. In the original
Becker (1980) model, a consumer facing a constant interest rate invests according to the following
rules: accumulate wealth indenitely if the interest rate exceeds his rate of time preference, deplete
his wealth until it reaches zero if the opposite is true, and maintain a constant positive level of wealth
if the two rates coincide. Since no one can accumulate wealth indenitely in a stationary equilibrium,
the equilibrium interest rate is determined by the lowest rate of time preference among the consumers.
It follows that less patient consumers would end up having zero wealth. In contrast, a consumer who
values wealth directly is willing to hold a constant positive amount of wealth even if the equilibrium
interest rate is lower than his rate of time preference. A direct preference for wealth essentially in-
troduces an additional motive for accumulating assets. This additional motive keeps consumers from
depleting their wealth to zero.
A calibrated version of the baseline model is able to replicate some key features of the wealth
distribution in the United States. In particular, it is able to generate a large group of wealth-poor
6Studies that explore the implications of wealth preference on asset pricing include Bakshi and Chen (1996), and
Boileau and Braeu (2007) among others. Studies on economic growth include Zou (1994) and Smith (1999) among
others. Karnizova (2010) introduces this type of preferences into a neoclassical growth model with capital adjustment
costs and shows that the model can generate expectations-driven business cycles. Gong and Zou (2002) and Nakamoto
(2009) examine the welfare implications of scal policy when consumers value wealth directly. Finally, Luo and Young
(2009) explore the implications of wealth preference on wealth inequality. This study will be discussed later on.
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consumers and a very small group of extremely wealthy ones. However, the baseline model falls short
in explaining income inequality. This problem remains even if we allow for endogenous labor supply.
These results show that, in the absence of human capital formation, time preference heterogeneity alone
cannot generate substantial wealth and income inequality simultaneously. To achieve this, it is essential
to create a strong positive correlation between wealth and earnings. This correlation can be obtained
by introducing human capital formation which allows more patient consumers to become earnings-rich
as well as wealth-rich. A calibrated version of the model with human capital can successfully replicate
the distributions of wealth and income in the United States.7
The current study is closely related to Luo and Young (2009) which extends the Aiyagari (1994)
model by introducing a direct preference for wealth. These authors nd that this additional feature
is a force that tends to reduce wealth inequality. This tendency is also observed in our model. First,
the equilibrium wealth distribution is no longer degenerate once we introduce this type of preferences
into Beckers model. Second, in the quantitative analysis, we nd that the degree of wealth inequality
decreases as we increase the coe¢ cient that controls the strength of wealth preference.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline model environment,
presents the main theoretical results and evaluates the quantitative relevance of this model. Section
3 extends the baseline model by including endogenous labor supply. Section 4 presents the extension
with human capital formation. This is followed by some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 The Baseline Model
2.1 Preferences
Consider an economy inhabited by a large number of innitely-lived agents. The size of population
is constant over time and is given by N: Each agent is indexed by a subjective discount factor i; for
i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng : The discount factors are ranked according to 1 > 1  2  : : :  N > 0: There is
a single commodity in this economy which can be used for consumption and investment. The agents
preferences can be represented by
1X
t=0
tiu (cit; kit) ; (1)
7We do not claim that other factors, such as life-cycle factors, income uncertainty, redistributive taxation and transfer
programs, are not important in understanding economic inequality. The main objective of the calibration exercise is to
illustrate the quantitative relevance of the mechanism captured by this model in explaining economic inequality.
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where cit is the consumption of agent i at time t and kit is the stock of capital owned by the agent
at the beginning of time t:8 The period utility function u : R2+ ! R is assumed to be identical for all
agents and have the following properties:
Assumption A1 The function u (c; k) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave in (c; k) : It also satises the Inada condition for consumption, i.e., lim
c!0
uc (c; k) = 1;
where uc (c; k) is the partial derivative with respect to c:
Assumption A2 The function u (c; k) is homogeneous of degree 1  ; with  > 0:
Assumption A2 is imposed to ensure the existence of balanced growth equilibria. Under this
assumption, the partial derivatives uc (c; k) and uk (c; k) are both homogeneous of degree  : We can
then dene a function h : R+ ! R according to
h (z)  uk (z; 1)
uc (z; 1)
: (2)
Under Assumption A1, the function h (z) is continuously di¤erentiable and non-negative. We now
impose some additional assumptions on this function.
Assumption A3 The function h (z) dened by (2) is strictly increasing and satises h (0) = 0 and
lim
z!1h (z) =1:
It is straightforward to check that if uck (c; k)  0 then h (z) is strictly increasing. The converse,
however, is not true in general. In other words, Assumption A3 does not preclude the possibility of
having a negative cross-derivative for some values of c and k.9
All three assumptions stated above are satised by the following functional forms which are com-
monly used in the existing literature,
u (c; k) =
1
1  
 
c1  + k1 

; (3)
8This type of preferences is also considered in Kurz (1968), Majumdar and Mitra (1994), Zou (1994), Bakshi and Chen
(1996), Gong and Zou (2001), Boileau and Braeu (2007), and Luo and Young (2009) among others. Karnizova (2010)
assumes that wealth e¤ect is derived from the stock of capital owned by the agent at the end of the current period, i.e.,
kit+1.
9Majumdar and Mitra (1994) show that, in a model economy with homogeneous consumers, the sign of the cross
derivative uck (c; k) plays an important role in determining the dynamic properties of the model. In the current study,
we only focus on stationary equilibria.
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with  > 0 and  > 0; and
u (c; k) =
1
1  
h
c + (1  ) k 
i 1 
 
; (4)
with  > 0;  2 (0; 1) and  < 1:
2.2 The AgentsProblem
In each period, each agent is endowed with one unit of time which is supplied inelastically to the
market. The agents receive labor income from work and interest income from previous savings. All
savings are held in the form of physical capital, which is the only asset in this economy. As in Becker
(1980), the agents are not allowed to borrow in every period.
Given a sequence of wages and rental rates, the agentsproblem is to choose sequences of consump-
tion and capital so as to maximize their discounted lifetime utility, subject to sequences of budget
constraints and borrowing constraints. Let wt and rt be the market wage rate and the rental rate of
capital at time t: Formally, agent is problem is given by
max
fcit;kit+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
tiu (cit;kit)
subject to
cit + kit+1   (1  ) kit = wt + rtkit; (5)
kit+1  0; and ki0 > 0 given.10 The parameter  2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of capital.
The agentsoptimal choices are completely characterized by the sequential budget constraint in
(5), and the Euler equation
uc (cit;kit)  i [uk (cit+1;kit+1) + (1 + rt+1   )uc (cit+1;kit+1)] ; (6)
which holds with equality if kit+1 > 0: Introducing a direct preference for wealth essentially creates
some additional benets for holding wealth. These additional benets are captured by the term
uk (cit+1;kit+1) in the Euler equation. If agents do not value wealth directly, then uk (cit+1;kit+1) = 0
and the Euler equation in (6) will be identical to the one in Becker (1980).
10 In both theoretical and quantitative analyses, we focus on balanced-growth equilibria which are independent of the
initial conditions. Thus, the initial distribution of capital across agents is irrelevant to our analyses.
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2.3 Production
Output is produced according to a standard neoclassical production function:
Yt = F (Kt; XtLt) ;
where Yt denote aggregate output at time t, Kt is aggregate capital, Lt is aggregate labor and Xt is
the level of labor-augmenting technology. We will refer to bLt  XtLt as the e¤ective unit of labor.
The technological factor is assumed to grow at a constant exogenous rate so that Xt  t for all t;
where   1 is the exogenous growth factor and X0 is normalized to one. The production function
F : R2+ ! R+ is assumed to have all the usual properties which are summarized below.
Assumption A4 The production function F

K; bL is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave in each argument. It exhibits constant returns to scale and satises the
following conditions: F

0; bL = 0 for all bL  0; F (K; 0) = 0 for all K  0; lim
K!0
FK

K; bL =1 and
lim
K!1
FK

K; bL = 0:
Because of the constant-returns-to-scale assumption, we can focus on a representative rm whose
problem is given by
max
Kt;Lt
fF (Kt; XtLt)  wtLt   rtKtg :
The solution of this problem is completely characterized by the rst-order conditions:
wt = XtFbL (Kt; XtLt) = XtFbL
bkt; 1 (7)
and
rt = FK (Kt; XtLt) = FK
bkt; 1 ; (8)
where bkt  Kt= (XtLt) is the amount of capital per e¤ective unit of labor at time t:
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
Let ct = (c1t; c2t; :::; cNt) denote a distribution of consumption across agents at time t and kt =
(k1t; k2t; :::; kNt) be a distribution of capital at time t. A competitive equilibrium consists of sequences
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of distributions of consumption and capital, fct;ktg1t=0 ; sequences of aggregate inputs, fKt; Ltg1t=0 ;
and sequences of prices, fwt; rtg1t=0 ; so that
(i) Given the prices fwt; rtg1t=0 ; the sequences fcit; kitg1t=0 solve agent is problem.
(ii) In each period t  0; given the prices wt and rt; the aggregate inputs Kt and Lt solve the
representative rms problem, i.e., (7) and (8) are satised.
(iii) All markets clear in every period, so that for each t  0;
Kt =
NX
i=1
kit; and
NX
i=1
cit +Kt+1   (1  )Kt = F (Kt; XtN) :
In this paper, we conne our attention to balanced-growth equilibria. Formally, a balanced-growth
equilibrium consists of sequences S = fct;kt;Kt; Lt; wt; rtg1t=0 such that
(i) S is a competitive equilibrium as dened above.
(ii) The rental rate of capital is stationary over time, i.e., rt = r for all t:
(iii) Individual consumption and capital, aggregate capital and the wage rate are all growing at the
same constant rate. The common growth factor is given by   1:
2.5 Theoretical Results
The main objective of this subsection is to show that, under certain conditions, the baseline model
possesses a unique balanced-growth equilibrium in which all agents hold a strictly positive amount
of capital. To begin with, a balanced-growth equilibrium is characterized by a constant r which
clears the capital market. Once this variable is determined, all other variables in a balanced-growth
equilibrium can be uniquely determined. Thus it su¢ ces to establish the existence and uniqueness of
r. To achieve this, we rst formulate the supply and demand for capital as a function of r:
Denote by bkd (r) the amount of capital per e¤ective unit of labor that the representative rm desires
when the rental rate is r: The function bkd (r) is implicitly dened by the condition:
r = FK
bkd; 1 : (9)
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Under Assumption A4, the function bkd : R++ ! R+ is continuously di¤erentiable and strictly decreas-
ing. Moreover, bkd (r) approaches innity as r tends to zero from the right and approaches zero as r
tends to innity. If r is an equilibrium rental rate, then the equilibrium wage rate at time t is uniquely
determined by wt = t bw (r) ; where
bw (r) = FbL bkd (r) ; 1 : (10)
Next, we consider the supply side of the capital market. Along any balanced-growth equilibrium
path, individual consumption and capital can be expressed as cit = tbci and kit = tbki; where bci andbki are stationary over time. The values of bci and bki are determined by agent is budget constraint and
the Euler equation for consumption. Along a balanced growth path, the budget constraint becomes
bci = bw (r) + r   bbki; (11)
where b     1 +   : Under Assumptions A2 and A3, the Euler equation can be expressed as

i
  (1  )  r  h
bcibki

; (12)
which holds with equality if bki > 0: By Assumption A3, we have h (z)  0 for all z  0: In the current
context, z is the consumption-capital ratio for agent i, which must be non-negative in equilibrium.
Thus, the Euler equation is valid only for r  bri; where bri  =i   (1  ) > 0: This essentially
imposes an upper bound on the equilibrium rental rate, which is min
i
fbrig = br1:11 For any r 2 (0; br1) ;
it is never optimal for any agent i to choose a zero value for bki:12 It follows that the Euler equation for
consumption will always hold with equality in a balanced-growth equilibrium. Combining equations
(11) and (12) gives

i
  (1  )  r = h
 bw (r)bki + r   b

; (13)
which determines the relationship between bki and r: Formally, this can be expressed as bki = gi (r) ;
11 If r > br1; then the Euler equation will not be satised for some agents and so r cannot be an equilibrium rental rate.
12To see this, suppose the contrary that some agent i chooses to have bki = 0 in a balanced-growth equilibrium. Then
the right-hand side of (12) would become innite as lim
z!1
h (z) = 1 under Assumption A3. This clearly exceeds the
left-hand side of the inequality for any r 2 (0; br1) and hence gives rise to a contradiction. This also means that in order
to have bki > 0 in equilibrium, one can replace the assumption of lim
z!1
h (z) = 1 by lim
z!1
h (z) > =N   (1  ) in
Assumption A3.
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where gi : (0; bri)! R+ is a continuously di¤erentiable function implicitly dened by (13).
Denote by bks (r) the aggregate supply of capital per e¤ective unit of labor when the rental rate is
r 2 (0; br1) : Formally, this is dened as
bks (r) = 1
N
NX
i=1
gi (r) :
Since each gi (r) is continuous on (0; br1) ; the function bks (r) is also continuous on this range. A
balanced-growth equilibrium exists if there exists at least one value r within the range (0; br1) that
solves the capital market equilibrium condition:
bkd (r) = bks (r) : (14)
Once r is determined, all other variables, including the cross-sectional distributions of consumption
and capital (ct;kt) ; the aggregate capital Kt and the wage rate wt, can be uniquely determined. If
there exists at most one such value of r; then the balanced-growth equilibrium is unique. Theorem 1
provides the conditions under which a unique value of r exists. The proof of this result can be found
in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumptions A1-A4 are satised. Suppose the following condition holds
bkd b > bks b : (15)
Then there exists a unique balanced-growth equilibrium in which all agents hold a strictly positive
amount of capital. In addition, more patient agents would have more consumption and hold more
capital than less patient ones, i.e., i > j implies bci > bcj and bki > bkj :
We now explain the intuitions behind Theorem 1. To facilitate comparison with the results in
Becker (1980), we set  = 1 for the moment. For each i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng ; i  1=i   1 is the rate of
time preference for agent i: When wealth is not directly valued, an agent in a stationary equilibrium
will invest according to the following rules: accumulate capital indenitely if the e¤ective return from
investment (r   ) exceeds his rate of time preference, deplete capital until it reaches zero if the
e¤ective return is lower than his rate of time preference, and maintain a constant positive capital
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stock if the two are equal. Since there is only one e¤ective return from investment, it is not possible
for agents with di¤erent rates of time preference to maintain a constant capital stock simultaneously.
At the same time, no one can accumulate capital indenitely in a stationary equilibrium. Thus the
e¤ective return must be equated to the lowest rate of time preference among the agents. It follows
that only the most patient agents will hold a positive level of capital in the steady state, and that all
other agents with a higher rate of time preference will deplete their capital until it reaches zero.
Introducing a direct preference for wealth breaks this spell by creating some additional benets of
holding capital. These additional benets fundamentally change the consumersinvestment behavior.
In particular, an agent is now willing to maintain a constant positive capital stock even if the e¤ective
return from investment is lower than his rate of time preference. This is made clear by the Euler
equation
i   (r   ) =
uk
bci;bki
uc
bci;bki > 0;
which implies i > (r
   ) for all i: It is now possible to obtain a non-degenerate capital distribution
because agents with di¤erent rates of time preference can choose a di¤erent value of bki based on the
above equation. For impatient agents, they are willing to hold a constant capital stock only if they are
compensated by large utility gains from wealth. Under the stated assumptions, this type of benet
is diminishing in bki: Thus, less patient agents would choose a smaller value of bki than more patient
ones.13
2.6 Calibration
We now evaluate the ability of the baseline model to explain the observed patterns of inequality in
the United States. To achieve this, we have to rst specify the form of the utility function and the
production function, and assign specic values to the model parameters. Some of these values are
chosen based on empirical ndings. Others are chosen to match some real-world targets. The details
of this procedure are explained below.
13Condition (15) in Theorem 1 is imposed to ensure that the equilibrium rental rate r is greater than b: According to
(11), r > b is both necessary and su¢ cient to guarantee that individual consumption and capital holdings are positively
correlated in the balanced-growth equilibrium.
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Functional Forms and Parameters
In the numerical exercise, the production function is given by
F (K;XL) = K (XL)1  ;
with  2 (0; 1) : The period utility function is assumed to be additively separable as in (3). In this
functional form, the parameter  captures the strength of wealth preference. The original Becker
model corresponds to the case in which  = 0: The additively separable specication is chosen for the
following reasons. In the current model, individualsinvestment decisions are completely characterized
by equation (13). Under the additively separable utility function, this equation can be expressed as

i
  (1  )  r = 
 bw (r)bki + r   b

: (16)
Under the non-separable functional form in (4), this equation becomes

i
  (1  )  r = 1  

 bw (r)bki + r   b
1  
: (17)
A direct comparison of these equations suggests that they can be made identical by a suitable choice
of parameter values. When this is imposed, all agents will have the same optimal investment rule
gi (r) under the two specications of u (c; k). It follows that the equilibrium rental rate r and the
wealth distribution will also be identical.14 This result suggests that these two forms of utility function
are likely to yield quantitatively similar results in the balanced-growth equilibrium.15 We choose the
additively separable form because it involves fewer parameters.
14Formally, let bc = (bc1; :::;bcN ) and bk = bk1; :::;bkN be the distributions of consumption and capital obtained under the
non-separable specication in (4) with a common growth factor : Then the same distributions can be obtained under
an additively separable utility function with  = 1    ;  = (1  ) =; and a common growth factor e =  1  : In the
expression 

1  ; the parameter  is the one that appears in the non-separable utility function.
15We stress that the above argument is valid only in the balanced-growth equilibrium. The two specications are likely
to yield very di¤erent results along any transition path.
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Table 1 Benchmark Parameters
 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1
 Share of capital income in total output 0.33
 Common growth factor 1.022
min Minimum value of subjective discount factor 0.966
max Maximum value of subjective discount factor 0.992
The following parameter values are used in the quantitative exercise. The share of capital income
in total output () is 0.33. The growth rate of per-capita variables (   1) is 2.2 percent, which is the
average annual growth rate of real per-capita GDP in the United States over the period 1950-2000.
The parameter  in the utility function is set to one, which is the same as in Luo and Young (2009).
The range of subjective discount factors is chosen based on the estimates in Lawrance (1991). Using
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics over the period 1974-1982, Lawrance (1991) estimates
that the average rate of time preference for households in the bottom fth percentile of the income
distribution is 3.5 percent, after controlling for di¤erences in age, educational level and race. This
implies an average discount factor of 1/(1+0.035)=0.966 for these households. The estimated rate
of time preference for the richest ve percent is 0.8 percent, which corresponds to a discount factor
of 0.992.16 In the benchmark scenario, we consider a hypothetical population of 1,000 agents with
discount factors uniformly distributed between 0.966 and 0.992. The mean discount factor is 0.979.
Our aim here is to illustrate the relationship between  and the degree of wealth and income
inequality. To achieve this, we consider di¤erent values of  ranging from 0.005 to 0.5. For each value
of ; the depreciation rate () is chosen so that the capital-output ratio is 3.0. Table 1 summarizes the
parameter values used in the benchmark economy.
Findings
Table 2 summarizes the main ndings of this exercise. The reported results include the Gini coe¢ cients
for wealth and income, the coe¢ cients of variation for wealth and income, and the shares of wealth held
by the bottom and top percentiles of the wealth distribution. The data of these inequality measures
16The estimates in Lawrance (1991) are obtained by estimating the Euler equation for a model without direct preferences
for wealth. This range of values, however, encompasses the values of  that are typically used in quantitative studies
(with or without wealth preference). In the next subsection, we will discuss the e¤ects of changing the distribution of
discount factor on the baseline results.
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are taken from Budría et al. (2002).
Wealth and Income Inequality Table 2 shows a strong negative relationship between wealth
inequality and the value of : This can also be seen from Figure 1, which shows the Lorenz curves
for wealth under di¤erent values of : As  approaches zero, both the Gini coe¢ cient for wealth and
the share of wealth held by the top one percent of the wealth distribution increase towards unity.
This means the wealth distribution becomes more and more concentrated when the strength of wealth
preference decreases. This result is consistent with theoretical predictions as  = 0 corresponds to the
original Becker (1980) model. When the value of  is small, the baseline model is able to replicate
some key features of the wealth distribution in the United States. In particular, it is able to generate a
highly concentrated distribution of wealth with a large group of wealth-poor agents and a small group
of extremely wealthy agents. For instance, when  = 0:012 the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth generated by
the model is 0.804. When  = 0:0177; the wealthiest ve percent own 56.8 percent of total wealth in
the model economy, while the wealthiest one percent own 34.4 percent. These gures are very close to
the actual values reported in Budría et al. (2002).
As the value of  increases, wealth becomes more and more uniformly distributed across the agents.
This can be explained as follows. Holding other things constant, an increase in  raises the marginal
utility of wealth. In other words, the same increase in capital holdings can now generate a larger
gain in utility. This e¤ectively diminishes the di¤erences in discount factor across agents. To see this
formally, set  = 1 and rewrite equation (16) as
1



i
  (1  )  r

=
bw (r)bki + r   b:
Totally di¤erentiate this with respect to i and zi 
bki 1 gives
dzi
di
=  1

bw (r)

1
i
2
< 0:
This expression tells us how the cross-sectional variation in discount factor are transformed into vari-
ation in zi under a given value of r: In particular, holding r constant, cross-sectional variation in zi
diminishes as  increases. Since there is an one-to-one relationship between zi and bki; this means the
variation in bki also diminishes as  increases. In other words, the e¤ects of time preference heterogeneity
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almost vanish when  is large.
Table 2 also shows that the baseline model tends to generate a relatively low degree of income
inequality. This is true even when there is substantial inequality in wealth. For instance, when
 = 0:0177; the Gini coe¢ cient for income is 0.235, as compared to 0.713 for wealth. This occurs
because labor income represents a sizable portion of total income for most of the agents in this economy.
Table 3 reports the share of total income from labor income for di¤erent wealth groups. When  is
0.0177 or less, labor income accounts for more than 80 percent of total income for the majority of the
agents. Since there is no variation in labor income across agents, the degree of income inequality is
thus low.
In sum, our quantitative results show that the baseline model is able to replicate some key features
of the wealth distribution in the United States. However, it falls short of explaining income inequality.
This is partly because labor income is identical for all agents. The two extensions considered in Sections
3 and 4 are intended to change this feature of the baseline model.
Changing the Range of Discount Factors In the benchmark scenario, the minimum and the
maximum values of discount factor are 0.966 and 0.992, respectively. We now consider ve di¤erent
variations of these values. We maintain the uniform distribution assumption in each case. In the rst
variation, the benchmark values are both reduced by 0.01 so that min = 0:956 and max = 0:982: In
the second variation, the benchmark values are both reduced by 0.02. In these two experiments, the
range, 4  jmax   minj ; is the same as in the benchmark case. In the third and fourth experiments,
this range is reduced by half. Specically, we consider the upper half of the benchmark interval in the
third experiment, so that min = 0:979 and max = 0:992; and the lower half in the fourth one. In the
nal experiment, we extend the benchmark interval to the left by 50 percent, so that min = 0:953 and
max = 0:992:
Table 4 reports the results of these experiments under three di¤erent values of : To facilitate
comparison, we also show the benchmark results in each case. Two observations can be made from
these results. First, shifting the distribution of discount factors while leaving the range 4 unchanged
only has a small impact on wealth inequality. This is true for all three values of  considered. This
shows that the current model does not rely on large discount factors to generate a substantial degree
of wealth inequality. Second, wealth inequality is positively related to the size of 4: This is evident
from the results of the last three experiments. These results show that the distribution of discount
16
factor is another important factor in determining wealth inequality in this model.
In sum, these experiments show that wealth inequality in the baseline model is sensitive to changes
in the range of discount factors but not so sensitive to changes in the actual values of max and min:
3 Endogenous Labor Supply
In this section, we extend the baseline model to include endogenous labor supply decisions. The agents
period utility function is now given by
u (c; k; l) =
c1 
1   + 
k1 
1     
l1+1=
1 + 1=
; (18)
where l denote the amount of time spent on working,  is a positive parameter and  > 0 is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) of labor. The agentslabor income is now endogenously
determined by their choice of working hours. The rest of the model is the same as in Section 2.
A balanced-growth equilibrium for this economy can be dened similarly as in Section 2.4. This
type of equilibrium now includes, among other things, a stationary distribution of labor which is
represent by l = (l1; l2;:::; lN ) : Let bkd (r) and bw (r) be the functions dened in (9) and (10). The
equilibrium values of
nbci;bki; lioN
i=1
and the equilibrium rental rate r are determined by
1



i
  (1  )  r

=
bcibki

; (19)
bw (r)bci =  (li) 1 ; (20)
bci = bw (r) li + r   bbki; (21)
NX
i=1
bki =  NX
i=1
li
!bkd (r) ; (22)
where b     1 + : Equation (19) is the Euler equation evaluated along a balanced-growth path.
Equation (20) is the rst-order condition with respect to labor. Equation (21) is derived from the
agents budget constraint. Equation (22) is the capital market equilibrium condition.
We now consider the same numerical exercise as in Section 2.6. The production function again takes
the Cobb-Douglas form and the parameter values in Table 1 are used. The intertemporal elasticity of
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substitution of labor is set to 0.4.17 As in Section 2.6, we focus on the relationship between  and the
degree of inequality in wealth and income. We consider the same set of values for  as in Table 2. In
each case, the preference parameter  is chosen so that the average amount of time spent on working
is one-third and the depreciation rate  is chosen so that the capital-output ratio is 3.0.
Table 5 shows the inequality measures obtained under  = 0:4: When comparing these to the
baseline results in Table 2, it is immediate to see that the two sets of results are almost identical.
Introducing endogenous labor supply decisions does not change the fundamental mechanism in the
baseline model. In particular, the model continues to generate a high degree of wealth inequality
when  is small and a relatively low degree of income inequality in general. Our numerical results
show that allowing for endogenous labor supply actually lowers the Gini coe¢ cient for income. This
can be explained by Figure 2, which shows the relationship between discount factor and labor supply.
Most of the agents in this economy, except those who are very patient, choose to have the same
amount of labor. Consequently, the distribution of labor is close to uniform. This explains why the
extended model generates a similar degree of income inequality as the baseline model. Since labor
supply decreases as the discount factor increases, an impatient agent has less capital income but more
labor income than a (very) patient agent. In other words, the two sources of income are negatively
correlated. This negative correlation in e¤ect reduces income inequality.
4 Human Capital Formation
4.1 The Model
In this section, we extend the baseline model to include human capital formation. The agentsperiod
utility function is now given by18
u (c; k) = log c+  log k;  > 0:
17As a robustness check, we also consider two other values of this elasticity, which are 0.2 and 1.0. These results are
not shown in the paper because they are almost identical to those obtained under  = 0:4: In particular, increasing this
elasticity from 0.2 to 1.0 only marginally a¤ects the Gini coe¢ cients for wealth and income. These results are available
from the author upon request.
18Given that u (c; k) is additively separable in its arguments, logarithmic functional form is the only functional form
that is consistent with balanced-growth equilibria in this model. See Appendix B for details.
18
In each period, all agents are endowed with one unit of time which they can divide between market
work and on-the-job training. Denote by hit the stock of human capital of agent i at time t: If this
agent chooses to spend a fraction lit 2 [0; 1] of time on market work at time t; then his human capital
at time t+ 1 is given by
hit+1 =  (1  lit) hit + (1  h)hit; (23)
where  > 0;  2 (0; 1) ;  2 (0; 1) ; and h 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of human capital. The
agents labor income at time t is given by wtlithit: We refer to lithit as the e¤ective unit of labor and
wt as the market wage rate for an e¤ective unit of labor.
Let rt be the rental rate of physical capital at time t: Agent is problem is now given by
max
fcit;lit;kit+1;hit+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
tiu (cit;kit)
subject to
cit + kit+1   (1  k) kit = wtlithit + rtkit;
kit+1  0; lit 2 [0; 1] ;
the human capital accumulation equation in (23), and the initial conditions: ki0 > 0 and hi0 > 0: The
parameter k 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of physical capital. The rest of the model economy is
the same as in Section 2. In particular, long-term growth in per-capita variables is again fueled by
an exogenous improvement in labor-augmenting technology.19 The exogenous growth factor is again
given by   1:
A balanced-growth equilibrium for this economy can be dened similarly as in Section 2.4. In
here we only present the key equations that characterize this type of equilibrium. A formal denition
can be found in Appendix B. A balanced-growth equilibrium now includes, among other things, a
stationary distribution of labor, l = (l1; l2; :::; lN ) ; and a stationary distribution of human capital,
h = (h1; h2; :::; hN ) : The equilibrium values of
nbci;bki; li; hioN
i=1
and the equilibrium rental rate r are
determined by

i
  (1  k)  r = 
bcibki

; (24)
19Unlike the endogenous growth model considered in Lucas (1988), human capital accumulation does not serve as the
engine of growth in here. This is implicitly implied by the condition  < 1: The main idea of introducing human capital
in this model is to increase the variation in labor income across agents.
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bci = bw (r) lihi + r   bbki; (25)
li
1  li =
1


1
h

1
i
  (1  h)

  

; (26)
hi =


h
(1  li)
 1
1 
; (27)
and
NX
i=1
bki =  NX
i=1
lihi
!bkd (r) ; (28)
where b   1+k: Equations (24) and (25) are derived from the Euler equation for consumption and
the agents budget constraint. Equations (26) and (27) are derived from the rst-order conditions with
respect to lit and hit+1; and the human capital accumulation equation. Equation (28) is the capital
market equilibrium condition. The mathematical derivations of these can be found in Appendix B.
According to (26) and (27), the distributions of labor and human capital are completely determined
by two factors: (i) the distribution of subjective discount factor and (ii) the parameters in the human
capital accumulation process. In particular, these two distributions are independent of the period
utility function u (c; k), and thus the parameter : If the agents do not value wealth directly, i.e.,
uk (c; k)  0; then the distribution of capital is degenerate but the distributions of labor and human
capital would still be non-degenerate.
4.2 Calibration
Parameters
In the quantitative exercise, we use the same specication for production technology, and the same
distribution of discount factor as before. Specically, the production function for goods takes the
Cobb-Douglas form with  = 0:33: The population contains 1,000 agents with subjective discount
factors uniformly distributed between 0.966 and 0.992.
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Table 6 Parameters in Model with Human Capital
 Strength of wealth preference 0.0139
min Minimum value of subjective discount factor 0.966
max Maximum value of subjective discount factor 0.992
 Share of capital income in total output 0.33
 Common growth factor 1.022
k Depreciation rate of physical capital 0.08029
h Depreciation rate of human capital 0.03
 Parameter in human capital production 1
 Parameter in human capital production 0.939
 Parameter in human capital production 0.871
As for the parameter values in the human capital production function, we normalize  to unity and
set the values of  and  according to the estimates reported in Heckman et al. (1998). Using data
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for the period 1979-1993, these authors nd that the
values of  and  for high school graduates are 0.945 and 0.832, respectively. The corresponding values
for college graduates are 0.939 and 0.871, respectively. The results generated by these two sets of values
turn out to be almost identical. In the following section, we only report the results for  = 0:939 and
 = 0:871: As for the depreciation rate of human capital, Heckman et al. (1998) assume that it is zero.
Other studies in the existing literature nd that this rate is usually small and close to zero.20 We use
a depreciation rate of 3 percent, which is consistent with the estimates reported in Haley (1976).
It is now clear that the choice of  is key to explaining wealth inequality. In here we choose the
value of  so as to match the Gini coe¢ cient for wealth as reported in Budría et al. (2002). Similar
strategy is also used in Krusell and Smith (1998), Erosa and Koreshkova (2007), and Hendricks (2007)
to determine the parameters involved in the Markov process of the stochastic discount factor.21 In the
numerical results reported below, we target a value of 0.803 for the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth. The
required value of  is 0.0139. As explained above, the distributions of labor and human capital are
independent of : Thus the distribution of earnings reported below is not inuenced by this parameter.
20See Browning et al. (1999) Table 2.3 for a summary of this literature.
21Conceptually, this strategy of choosing  is also no di¤erent from choosing the preference parameter  in (18) to
match the average amount of time spent on working, a practice commonly used in the real business cycle literature. In
both cases, the unobserved, undetermined parameter is chosen so that certain predictions of the model can match their
empirical counterparts.
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Finally, the depreciation rate of physical capital is chosen so that the capital-output ratio is 3.0. The
parameter values used in the quantitative exercise are summarized in Table 6.
Findings
Table 7 summarizes the characteristics of the earnings, income and wealth distributions generated by
the model. The rst three columns of the table show the Gini coe¢ cients, the coe¢ cients of variation
and the mean-to-median ratios for the three variables. The mean-to-median ratio is intended to
measure the degree of skewness in these distributions. The rest of Table 7 shows the share of earnings,
income and wealth held by agents in di¤erent percentiles of the corresponding distribution.
Similar to the baseline model, the extended model is able to generate a highly concentrated dis-
tribution of wealth with a large group of wealth-poor agents and a small group of extremely wealthy
agents. For instance, the share of total wealth owned by the agents in the second quintile of the wealth
distribution is merely 1.2 percent, whereas the share owned by the wealthiest ve percent is 52.9 per-
cent. These gures are very close to the actual values observed in the United States. The model is also
able to match quite closely the share of total wealth owned by agents in the other quintiles. As for the
income distribution, the model is able to generate a Gini coe¢ cient and a mean-to-median ratio that
are close to the observed values. Except for the top one percent of the income distribution, the model
is able to replicate almost exactly the share of aggregate income owned by di¤erent income groups.
As for earnings, the model yields a more equal distribution than that observed in the data. In the
model economy, the earnings-poor agents own a larger share of total earnings than their real-world
counterparts, while the earnings-rich agents own a lower share than that observed in the data. For
instance, agents in the second quintile of the earning distribution hold 7.3 percent of total earnings in
the model economy, while those who are in the top ve percent of the distribution own about 16 percent.
The corresponding gures in the United States are 4.0 percent and 31.1 percent, respectively. This
happens because the data include a large number of retirees with zero earnings. The model, however,
does not take this into account. According to Budría et al. (2002), 22.5 percent of households in
their sample have zero earnings and a large portion of these are retired people. If we consider only
households headed by employed worker, then the Gini coe¢ cients for earnings in the United States is
0.435. This value is very close to the one predicted by the model.
22
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a highly tractable dynamic general equilibrium model in which heterogeneity in
time preferences alone can generate the observed patterns of wealth and income inequality in the United
States. To achieve this, we extend the standard deterministic neoclassical growth model to include (i)
consumer heterogeneity in time preferences, (ii) a direct preference for wealth, and (iii) human capital
formation. Admittedly, the model is rather stylized and has abstracted away a number of factors that
are also relevant in explaining economic inequality. The main purpose of this study is to highlight
the role of one particular factor, namely time preferences, in determining both earnings and wealth.
Our model shows that the combination of time preference heterogeneity and human capital formation
can give rise to a strong positive correlation between earnings and wealth across agents, and that this
correlation is essential in explaining wealth and income inequality simultaneously. Our quantitative
results show that this highly tractable model can generate very realistic predictions regarding economic
inequality.
In the current study, we assume that consumers value wealth directly in their preferences. How
important is this feature to our quantitative results? First, this feature of consumers preferences
prevents the wealth distribution from collapsing into a degenerate distribution. This allows us to
obtain a realistic wealth distribution in the quantitative exercise. Our numerical results show that the
extent of wealth inequality is strongly inuenced by the coe¢ cient that controls the strength of wealth
preference. However, this is not the only decisive factor: the distribution of discount factor plays an
equally important role in determining wealth inequality. Our baseline results also show that wealth
preference alone cannot generate a substantial degree of income inequality. In the model with human
capital, wealth preference does not play any role in determining the distributions of hours and labor
earnings. These distributions are completely determined by (i) the distribution of discount factor, and
(ii) the parameters in the human capital accumulation process which are chosen based on empirical
ndings.
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Table 2 Wealth and Income Inequality in Baseline Model
Share of Wealth (%) Held by
Gini Coe¤. C.V. Bottom
 Wealth Income Wealth Income 40% Top 10% Top 5% Top 1%
0.005 0.918 0.303 22.04 7.27 2.1 90.6 87.7 80.9
0.010 0.836 0.276 13.19 4.35 4.1 81.2 75.4 61.9
0.012 0.804 0.265 10.11 3.34 4.9 77.4 70.5 54.4
0.0177 0.713 0.235 4.34 1.43 7.3 66.8 56.8 34.4
0.025 0.608 0.201 2.11 0.70 10.2 54.3 41.4 17.1
0.050 0.375 0.124 0.78 0.26 18.4 29.5 17.4 4.1
0.100 0.201 0.066 0.37 0.12 26.9 17.6 9.3 1.9
0.500 0.041 0.014 0.07 0.02 37.0 11.2 5.6 1.1
Data 0.803 0.553 6.53 3.57 1.0 69.1 57.8 34.7
Source: Budría et al. (2002). Note: C.V. refers to the coe¢ cient of variation.
Table 3 Share of Total Income from Labor Income (%) in Each Wealth Group
Percentiles in Wealth Distribution
 Bottom 1% 1-5% 5-10% 40-60% 90-95% 95-99% Top 1%
0.005 98.0 98.0 97.9 96.1 78.1 56.8 17.2
0.010 96.2 96.1 95.9 92.5 64.2 40.6 10.0
0.012 95.4 95.3 95.1 91.1 60.0 36.5 8.7
0.0177 93.4 93.3 92.9 87.4 50.9 29.2 7.6
0.025 91.0 90.8 90.4 83.3 44.6 26.6 11.1
0.050 84.6 84.3 83.7 74.6 45.6 38.1 33.1
0.100 78.0 77.7 77.1 69.4 54.9 52.5 51.1
0.500 69.6 69.5 69.3 67.1 64.6 64.4 64.2
Data 98.9 95.9 98.1 94.0 69.8 52.3 33.6
*Source: Budría et al. (2002) Table 7, excluding transfers.
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Table 4 Wealth Inequality under Di¤erent Ranges of Discount Factor
Share of Wealth (%) Held by
Bottom
 min max Gini 40% Top 10% Top 5% Top 1%
0.0177 0.966 0.992 0.713 7.3 66.8 56.8 34.4
0.956 0.982 0.719 7.1 67.5 57.7 35.6
0.946 0.972 0.724 7.0 68.1 58.5 36.7
0.979 0.992 0.486 14.1 40.4 26.7 7.6
0.966 0.979 0.494 13.8 41.4 27.7 8.1
0.953 0.992 0.809 4.8 77.9 71.1 55.3
0.050 0.966 0.992 0.375 18.4 29.5 17.4 4.1
0.956 0.982 0.381 18.1 30.1 17.8 4.2
0.946 0.972 0.388 17.8 30.6 18.2 4.4
0.979 0.992 0.199 27.0 17.6 9.2 1.9
0.966 0.979 0.204 26.7 17.8 9.4 2.0
0.953 0.992 0.512 13.2 43.2 29.3 8.9
0.100 0.966 0.992 0.201 26.9 17.6 9.3 1.9
0.956 0.982 0.205 26.7 17.8 9.4 2.0
0.946 0.972 0.209 26.4 18.1 9.5 2.0
0.979 0.992 0.102 32.9 13.2 6.8 1.4
0.966 0.979 0.104 32.8 13.3 6.8 1.4
0.953 0.992 0.295 21.9 23.3 12.9 2.8
Note: C.V. refers to the coe¢ cient of variation. Figures in bold are the benchmark results
as shown in Table 2.
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Table 5 Wealth and Income Inequality when  = 0:4
Share of Wealth (%) Held by
Gini Coe¤. C.V. Bottom
 Wealth Income Wealth Income 40% Top 10% Top 5% Top 1%
0.005 0.918 0.299 23.11 7.61 2.1 90.5 87.7 81.2
0.010 0.836 0.270 15.80 5.19 4.2 81.0 75.4 62.9
0.012 0.803 0.258 13.06 4.28 5.0 77.2 70.5 55.7
0.0177 0.710 0.225 5.84 1.89 7.4 66.4 56.5 35.7
0.025 0.600 0.188 2.04 0.64 10.4 53.4 40.4 16.4
0.050 0.369 0.118 0.77 0.24 18.6 29.1 17.0 4.0
0.100 0.203 0.068 0.37 0.12 26.8 17.7 9.3 2.0
0.500 0.052 0.025 0.09 0.04 36.2 11.5 5.8 1.2
Data 0.803 0.553 6.53 3.57 1.0 69.1 57.8 34.7
Source: Budría et al. (2002). Note: C.V. refers to the coe¢ cient of variation.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of this theorem is divided into three main steps. First, it is shown that there exists a rental
price er1 > b such that bks (r) ! 1 as r approaches er1 from the left. Since both bks (r) and bkd (r) are
continuous on
b; er1 and bks (er1) < 1; this result, together with bkd b > bks b, would ensure the
existence of at least one value of r 2
b; er1 that solves the equation
bkd (r) = bks (r) : (29)
The second step is to show that there exists at most one solution on the interval (0; er1) : Together,
these two steps show that a unique r exists in the interval
b; er1 : Finally, it is shown that i > j
implies bci > bcj and bki > bkj :
Step 1 For each i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng ; one can show that there exists a unique value eri > b that solves

i
  (1  )  r = h

r   b :
First, h (0) = 0 < 

i
  (1  ) : Second, the left-hand side of the above expression is strictly decreasing
in r, while the right-hand side is strictly increasing in r. Hence the two cross at most once. It is
straightforward to show that eri < bri  =i   (1  ) and erN  erN 1  : : :  er1 > b given the
ordering 1 > 1  2  : : :  N > 0:
By the denitions of g1 (r) and er1; it must be the case that g1 (r) ! 1 as r approaches er1 from
the left. Since er1  eri < bri for any i  2; we have gi (r) > 0 for all i  2 when r is arbitrarily close toer1: Thus, as r approaches er1 from the left, we have bks (r) = 1N PNi=1 gi (r)!1:
Step 2 To establish the uniqueness of r; we need to consider the derivative of bks (r) : Using equation
(13), one can derive the derivative of gi (r), which is given by
g0i (r) =
1bw (r)
(
[gi (r)]
2 + bw0 (r) gi (r) + [gi (r)]2
h0 (zi (r))
)
;
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where zi (r)  bw (r) =gi (r) + r   b and bw0 (r) =  bkd (r) < 0: Hence the derivative of bks (r) is
d
dr
bks (r) = 1
N
NX
i=1
g0i (r)
=
1bw (r)
(
1
N
NX
i=1
[gi (r)]
2   bkd (r)bks (r) + 1
N
NX
i=1
[gi (r)]
2
h0 (zi (r))
)
:
Let r be any solution of (29). The derivative of bks (r) at r = r is
1bw (r)
(
1
N
NX
i=1
[gi (r
)]2  
hbks (r)i2 + 1
N
NX
i=1
[gi (r
)]2
h0 (zi (r))
)
;
after we imposed the condition bkd (r) = bks (r) : The above expression is strictly positive as
1
N
NX
i=1
[gi (r
)]2 
"
1
N
NX
i=1
gi (r
)
#2
=
hbks (r)i2 ;
and h0 (z) > 0: Since bkd (r) is monotonically decreasing, this means bks (r) must be cutting bkd (r) from
below at every intersection point. Since both bkd (r) and bks (r) are continuous, if there exists more than
one solution of (29) then at least of them must have bks (r) cutting bkd (r) from above. This gives rise
to a contradiction and hence establishes the uniqueness of r:
Step 3 Totally di¤erentiate the equation


  (1  )  r = h
 bw (r)bk + r   b

with respect to  and bk yields
dbk
d
= 
 bk

!2 
h0
 bw (r)bk + r   b
 1
> 0:
Hence i > j implies bki > bkj : Since the equilibrium rental rate r is strictly greater than b; bci is
positively related to bki according to (11).
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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Appendix B
This section provides the technical details of the model in Section 4. First, we dene a balanced-
growth equilibrium for this economy. A competitive equilibrium consists of sequences of distributions
of individual variables, fct;kt; lt;htg1t=0 ; sequences of aggregate inputs, fKt; Ltg1t=0 ; and sequences of
prices, fwt; rtg1t=0 ; so that
(i) Given the prices fwt; rtg1t=0 ; the sequences fcit; kit; lit; hitg1t=0 solve agent is problem.
(ii) In each period t  0; given the prices wt and rt; the aggregate inputs Kt and Lt solve the
representative rms problem.
(iii) All markets clear in every period, so that for each t  0;
Kt =
NX
i=1
kit and Lt =
NX
i=1
lithit:
A set of sequences S = fct;kt; lt;ht;Kt; Lt; wt; rtg1t=0 is called a balanced-growth equilibrium if the
following conditions are satised:
(i) S is a competitive equilibrium as dened above.
(ii) The rental rate of capital is stationary over time, i.e., rt = r for all t:
(iii) The distributions of labor and human capital are stationary over time.
(iv) Individual consumption and capital, aggregate capital and the wage rate are all growing at the
same constant rate. In particular, the common growth factor is   1:
We now provide the mathematical derivations of equations (24)-(27). Let it and  it be the
multipliers for the budget constraint and the human capital accumulation equation, respectively. The
rst-order conditions for the agents problem are given by
uc (cit; kit) = it; (30)
itwthit =  it (1  lit) 1 hit; (31)
it = i [uk (cit+1; kit+1) + it+1 (1 + rt+1   k)] ; (32)
31
 it = i
n
it+1wt+1lit+1 +  it+1
h
 (1  lit+1) h 1it+1 + (1  h)
io
: (33)
Combining (30) and (32) gives
uc (cit; kit)
uc (cit+1; kit+1)
= i

uk (cit+1; kit+1)
uc (cit+1; kit+1)
+ 1 + rt+1   k

:
Equation (24) can be obtained from this after imposing the balanced-growth conditions: cit = tbci and
kit = 
tbki: The derivation of (25) is straightforward and is omitted. Along a balanced-growth equi-
librium path, individual human capital is stationary. It follows from the human capital accumulation
equation that
hhi =  (1  li) hi :
Equation (27) follows immediately from this expression. Finally, combining (31) and (33) gives
 it = i it+1
n
 (1  lit+1) 1 h 1it+1 [ (1  lit+1) + lit+1] + (1  h)
o
:
In the balanced-growth equilibrium, the multiplier  it is stationary over time. To see this, combine
(30) and (31) to get
wt
cit
=  it (1  lit) 1 h 1it :
In a balanced-growth equilibrium, lit and hit are stationary while wt and cit are growing at the
same rate. Thus  it must be stationary over time. Note that the validity of this argument requires
uc (cit; kit) = 1=cit. It follows that, in this kind of equilibrium, we have
1 = i
n
 (1  li) 1 h 1i [ (1  li) + li] + (1  h)
o
:
Equation (26) can be obtained by substituting (27) into this.
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